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This paper introduces a microscopic approach to model epidemics,
which can explicitly consider the consequences of individual’s deci-
sions on the spread of the disease. We first formulate a microscopic
multi-agent epidemic model where every agent can choose its activity
level that affects the spread of the disease. Then by minimizing agents’
cost functions, we solve for the optimal decisions for individual agents
in the framework of game theory and multi-agent reinforcement learn-
ing. Given the optimal decisions of all agents, we can make predictions
about the spread of the disease. We show that there are negative exter-
nalities in the sense that infected agents do not have enough incentives
to protect others, which then necessitates external interventions to reg-
ulate agents’ behaviors. In the discussion section, future directions are
pointed out to make the model more realistic.2 2 This paper is adapted from the lec-
ture notes for Lectures 20 of 16-899
Adaptive Control and Reinforcement
Learning (Spring 2020) at CMU. The
course slides are available at https:
//piazza.com/class_profile/
get_resource/k54pll5057h79m/
k8qaky3o8x65bm. The code is avail-
able at https://github.com/
intelligent-control-lab/
Microscopic_Epidemic_Model.
Introduction
With the COVID-19 pandemic souring across the world, a reliable
model is needed to describe the observed spread of the disease, make
predictions about future, and guide public policy design to control
the spread.
Existing Epidemic Models There are many existing macroscopic epi-
demic models.3 For example, the SI model describes the growth of 3 Daryl J Daley and Joe Gani. Epidemic
modelling: an introduction, volume 15.
Cambridge University Press, 2001
infection rate as the product of the current infection rate and the cur-
rent susceptible rate. The SIR model further incorporates the effect
of recovery into the model, i.e., when the infected population turns
into immune population after a certain period of time. The SIRS
model considers the case that immunity is not for lifetime and that
the immune population can become susceptible population again. In
addition to these models, the SEIR model incorporates the incubation
period into analysis. Incubation period refers to the duration before
symptoms show up.4 The most important factor in all those models 4 Ping Yan and Shengqiang Liu. SEIR
epidemic model with delay. The
ANZIAM Journal, 48(1):119–134, 2006
is R0, the regeneration number, which tells how fast the disease can
spread. R0 can be regressed from data.
Limitations of Existing Models Although these models are useful in
predicting the spread of epidemics, they lack the granularity needed
for analyzing individual behaviors during an epidemic and un-
derstanding the relationship between individual decisions and the
spread of the disease.5 For example, many countries now announced 5 Christopher L Barrett, Keith Bisset,
Jonathan Leidig, Achla Marathe, and
Madhav Marathe. Estimating the
impact of public and private strategies
for controlling an epidemic: A multi-
agent approach. In Twenty-First IAAI
Conference, 2009
“lock-down", “shelter-in-place", “stay-at-home", or similar orders.
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However, their effects are very different across different countries, or
even across different counties in the same country. One factor that
can possibly explain these differences is the cultural difference. In
different cultures, individuals make different choices. For instance, in
the west, people exhibit greater inertia to give up their working/life
routines so that they do not follow the orders seriously. While in the
east, people tend to obey the rules better. These different individ-
ual choices can result in significantly different outcomes in disease
propagation that cannot be captured by a macroscopic model.
A Microscopic Epidemic Model In this paper, we develop a micro-
scopic epidemic model by explicitly considering individual decisions
and the interaction among different individuals in the population, in
the framework of multi-agent systems. The aforementioned cultural
difference can be understood as a difference in agents’ cost functions,
which then affect their behaviors when they are trying to minimize
their cost functions. The details of the microscopic epidemic model
will be explained in the next section, followed by the analysis of the
dynamics of the multi-agent system, and the prediction of system tra-
jectories using multi-agent reinforcement learning. The model is still
in its preliminary form. In the discussion section, future directions
are pointed out to make the model more realistic.
Microscopic Epidemic Model
Suppose there are M agents in the environment. Initially, m0 agents
are infected. Agents are indexed from 1 to M. Every agent has its
own state and control input. The model is in discrete time. The time
interval is set to be one day. The evolution of the infection rate for
consecutive days depends on agents’ actions. The questions of inter-
est are: How many agents will eventually be infected? How fast they
will be infected? How can we slow down the growth of the infection
rate?
Agent Model
We consider two state values for an agent, e.g., for agent i, xi = 0
means healthy (susceptible), xi = 1 means infected. Everyday, every
agent i decides its level of activities ui ∈ [0, 1]. The level of activ-
ities for agent i can be understood as the expected percentage of
other agents in the system that agent i wants to meet. For example,
ui = 1/M means agent i expects to meet one other agent. The actual
number of agents that agent i meets depends not only on agent i’s ac-
tivity level, but also on other agents’ activity level. For example, if all
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other agents choose an activity level 0, then agent i will not be able to
meet any other agent no matter what ui it chooses. Mathematically,
the chance for agent i and agent j to meet each other depends on the
minimum of the activity levels of these two agents, i.e., min{ui, uj}.
In the extreme cases, if agent i decides to meet everyone in the sys-
tem by choosing ui = 1, then the chance for agent j to meet with
agent i is uj. If agent i decides to not meet anyone in the system by
choosing ui = 0, then the chance for agent j to meet with agent i is 0.
Before we derive the system dynamic model, the assumptions are
listed below:6 6 These assumptions can all be relaxed
in future work. They are introduced
mainly for the simplicity of the discus-
sion.
1. In the agent model, we only consider two states: healthy (suscepti-
ble) and infected. All healthy agents are susceptible to the disease.
There is no recovery and no death for infected agents. There is no
incubation period for infected agents, i.e., once infected, the agent
can start to infect other healthy agents. To relax this assumption,
we may introduce more states for every agent.
2. The interactions among agents are assumed to be uniform, al-
though it is not true in the real world. In the real world, given a
fixed activity level, agents are more likely to meet with close fami-
lies, friends, colleagues than strangers on the street. To incorporate
this non-uniformity into the model, we need to redefine the chance
for agent i and agent j to meet each other to be βi,j min{ui, uj},
where βi,j ∈ [0, 1] is a coefficient that encodes the proximity be-
tween agent i and agent j and will affect the chance for them to
meet with each other. For simplicity, we assume that the interac-
tion patterns are uniform in this paper.
3. Meeting with infected agents will result in immediate infection. To
relax this assumption, we may introduce an infection probability
to describe how likely it is for a healthy agent to be infected if it
meets with an infected agent.
System Dynamic Model
On day k, denote agent i’s state and control as xi,k ∈ X and ui,k ∈ U .
By definition, the agent state space is X = {0, 1} and the agent
control space is U = [0, 1]. The system state space is denoted XM :=
X × · · · ×X . The system control space is denoted UM := U × · · · × U .
Define mk = ∑i xi,k as the number of infected agents at time k. The
set of infected agents is denoted:
Ik := {i : xi,k = 1}. (1)
The state transition probability for the multi-agent system is a
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mapping
T : XM ×UM ×XM 7→ [0, 1]. (2)
According to the assumptions, an infected agent will always re-
main infected. Hence the state transition probability for an infected
agent i does not depend on other agents’ states or any control. How-
ever, the state transition probability for a healthy agent i depends on
others. The chance for a healthy agent i to not meet an infected agent
j ∈ Ik is 1 −min{ui, uj}. A healthy agent can stay healthy if and
only if it does not meet any infected agent, the probability of which
is Πj∈Ik (1−min{ui, uj}). Then the probability for a healthy agent
to be infected is 1 − Πj∈Ik (1 −min{ui, uj}). From the expression
Πj∈Ik (1−min{ui, uj}), we can infer that: the chance for a healthy
agent i to stay health is higher if
• the agent i limits its own activity by choosing a smaller ui;
• the number of infected agents is smaller;
• the infected agents in Ik limit their activities.
The state transition probability for an agent i is summarized in
table 1.
xi,k = 0 xi,k = 1
xi,k+1 = 0 Πj∈Ik (1−min{ui, uj}) 0
xi,k+1 = 1 1−Πj∈Ik (1−min{ui, uj}) 1
Table 1: The state transition probability
from xi,k to xi,k+1 for an agent.
Example Consider a four-agent system shown in Fig. 1. Only agent 1
is infected. And the agents choose the following activity levels: u1 =
0.1, u2 = 0.2, u3 = 0.3, u4 = 0.4. Then the chance pi,j for agents i and j
to meet with each other is p1,2 = p1,3 = p1,4 = 0.1, p2,3 = p2,4 = 0.2,
and p3,4 = 0.3. Note that pi,j = pj,i. The chance for agents 2, 3, and 4
to stay healthy is 0.9, although they have different activity levels.
1
2 4
3
u1 = 0.1 u3 = 0.3
u4 = 0.4u2 = 0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.3
Figure 1: Example of a four-agent
system. Agent 1 is infected (shaded).
Other agents are healthy. The numbers
on the links denote the probability for
agents to meet with each other, which
depend on the chosen activity levels of
different agents.
Case Study
Before we start to derive the optimal strategies for individual agents
and analyze the closed-loop multi-agent system, we first character-
ize the (open-loop) multi-agent system dynamics by Monte Carlo
simulation according to the state transition probability in table 1.
Suppose we have M = 1000 agents. At the beginning, only agent 1
is infected. We consider two levels of activities: normal activity level
u and reduced activity level u∗. The two activity levels are assigned
to different agents following different strategies as described below.
In particular, we consider “no intervention" case where all agents
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continue to follow the normal activity level, “immediate isolation"
case where the activity levels of infected agents immediately drop to
the reduced level, “delayed isolation" case where the activity levels
of infected agents drop to the reduced level after several days, and
“lockdown" case where the activity levels of all agents drop to the
reduced level immediately.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
Days
Healthy Infected
Figure 2: Illustration of the result of one
Monte Carlo simulation when all agents
have the activity level u = 1/M. The
horizontal axis corresponds to day k.
The vertical axis corresponds to agent
ID i. The color in the graph represents
the value of xi,k , blue for 0 (healthy) and
yellow for 1 (infected).
For each case, we simulate 200 system trajectories and compute the
average, maximum, and minimum mk (number of infected agents)
versus k from all trajectories. A system trajectory in the “no inter-
vention" case is illustrated in Fig. 2, where u = 1/M for all agents.
The mk trajectories under different cases are shown in Fig. 3, where
the solid curves illustrate the average mk and the shaded area cor-
responds to the range from min mk to max mk. The results are ex-
plained below.
• Case 0: no intervention.
All agents keep the normal activity level u. The scenarios for
u = 1/M and u = 2/M are illustrated in Fig. 3. As expected,
a higher activity level for all agents will lead to faster infection.
The trajectory of mk has a S shape, whose growth rate is relatively
slow when either the infected population is small or the healthy
population is small, and is maximized when 50% agents are in-
fected. It will be shown in the following discussion that (empirical)
macroscopic models also generate S-curves.
• Case 1: immediate isolation of infected agents.
The activity levels of infected agents immediately drop to u∗,
while others remain u. The scenario for u = 1/M and u∗ = 0.1/M
is illustrated in Fig. 3. Immediate isolation significantly slows
down the growth of the infections rate. As expected, it has the
best performance in terms of flattening the curve, same as the
lockdown case. The trajectory also has a S shape.
• Case 2: delayed isolation of infected agents.
The activity levels of infected agents drop to u∗ after T days, while
others remain u. In the simulation, u = 1/M and u∗ = 0.1/M.
The scenarios for T = 1 and T = 2 are illustrated in Fig. 3. As
expected, the longer the delay, the faster the infection rate grows,
though the growth of the infection rate is still slower than the “no
intervention" case. Moreover, the peak growth rate (when 50%
agents are infected) is higher when the delay is longer.
• Case 3: lockdown.
The activity levels of all agents drop to u∗. The scenario for u∗ =
0.1/M is illustrated in Fig. 3. As expected, it has the best perfor-
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mance in terms of flattening the curve, same as the immediate
isolation case.7 7 In the case that infected population
can be asymptomatic or have a long
incubation period before they show
any symptom, like what we observe
for COVID-19, immediate identification
of infected person and then immediate
isolation is not achievable. Then lock-
down is the only best way to control the
spread of the disease in our model.
Since the epidemic model is monotone, every agent will eventually
be infected as long as the probability to meet infected agents does not
drop to zero. Moreover, we have not discussed decision making by
individual agents yet. The activity levels are just predefined in the
simulation.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
200
400
600
800
1000
No Intervention u=0.001
No Intervention u=0.001
No Intervention u=0.002
No Intervention u=0.002
Immediate Isolation u=0.001, u *=0.0001
Immediate Isolation u=0.001, u *=0.0001
1-Day Delayed Isolation u=0.001, u *=0.0001
1-Day Delayed Isolation u=0.001, u *=0.0001
2-Day Delayed Isolation u=0.001, u *=0.0001
2-Day Delayed Isolation u=0.001, u *=0.0001
Lock-down u *=0.0001
Lock-down u *=0.0001
Figure 3: The growth of the infection
rate under different activity levels
of agents. For every scenario, the
result is extracted from 200 Monte
Carlo simulations. The horizontal axis
corresponds to day k. The vertical axis
corresponds number of infected agents
mk . The solid curves are the average mk
and the shaded area corresponds to the
range from min mk to max mk .
Remark The model we introduced is microscopic, in the sense that
interactions among individual agents are considered. The simulated
open-loop trajectories are indeed similar to those from a macroscopic
model. Since only susceptible and infected populations are consid-
ered in the proposed microscopic model, we then compare it with
the macroscopic Susceptible-Infected (SI) model. Define the state
s ∈ [0, 1] as the fraction of infected population. The growth of the
infected population is proportional to the susceptible population and
the infected population. Suppose the infection coefficient is β, the
system dynamics in the SI model follow:
s˙ = βs(1− s). (3)
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 = 0.2
 = 0.3
 = 0.4
 = 0.5
 = 0.6
 = 0.7
 = 0.8
 = 0.9
 = 1.0
Figure 4: The system trajectories in the
macroscopic SI model. The horizontal
axis corresponds to days. The vertical
axis corresponds to the infection rate s.
We simulate the system trajectory under different infection coeffi-
cients as shown in Fig. 4. The trajectories also have S shapes, similar
to the ones in the microscopic model. However, since this macro-
scopic SI model is deterministic, there is no “uncertainty" range as
shown in the microscopic model. The infection coefficient β depends
on the agents’ choices of activity levels. However, there is not an
explicit relationship yet. It is better to directly use the microscopic
model to analyze the consequences of individual agents’ choices.
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Distributed Optimal Control
This section tries to answer the following question: in the micro-
scopic multi-agent epidemic model, what is the best control strategy
for individual agents? To answer that, we need to first specify the
knowledge and observation models as well as the cost (reward) func-
tions for individual agents. Then we will derive the optimal choices
of agents in a distributed manner. The resulting system dynamics
correspond to a Nash Equilibrium of the system.
Knowledge and Observation Model
A knowledge and observation model for agent i includes two as-
pects: what does agent i know about itself, and what does agent i
know about others? The knowledge about any agent j includes the
dynamic function of agent j and the cost function of agent j. The ob-
servation corresponds to run-time measurements, i.e., the observation
of any agent j includes the run-time state xj,k and the run-time con-
trol uj,k. In the following discussion, regarding the knowledge and
observation model, we make the following assumptions:
• An agent knows its own dynamics and cost function;
• All agents are homogeneous in the sense that they share the same
dynamics and cost functions. And agents know that all agents
are homogeneous, hence they know others’ dynamics and cost
functions;8 8 Not knowing other agents’ dynamics
or cost functions will result in infor-
mation asymmetry, which creates
difficulty in the analysis. Nonetheless,
the assumption can be relaxed in the
future.
• At time k, agents can measure xj,k for all j. But they cannot mea-
sure uj,k until time k + 1. Hence, the agents are playing a simul-
taneous game. They need to infer others’ decisions when making
their own decisions at any time k.
Cost Function
We consider two conflicting interests for every agent:9 9 The identification of these two con-
flicting interests is purely empirical. To
build realistic cost functions, we need
to either study the real world data or
conduct human subject experiments.
• Limit the activity level to minimize the chance to get infected;
• Maintain a certain activity level for living.
We define the run-time cost for agent i at time k as
li,k = xi,k+1 + αip(ui,k), (4)
where xi,k+1 corresponds to the first interest, p(ui,k) corresponds to
the second interest, and αi > 0 adjusts the preference between the
two interests. The function p(u) is assumed to be smooth.10 Due to 10 The function p(u) can be a decreasing
function on [0, 1], meaning that the
higher the activity level, the better.
The function p(u) can also be a convex
parabolic function on [0, 1] with the
minimum attained at some u∗, mean-
ing that the activity level should be
maintained around u∗.
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our homogeneity assumption on agents, they should have identical
preferences, i.e., αi = α for all i.
Agent i chooses its action at time k by minimizing the expected
cumulative cost in the future:
ui,k = arg minE[
∞
∑
t=k
γt−kli,k], (5)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a discount factor. The objective function depends
on all agents’ current and future actions. It is difficult to directly
obtain an analytical solution of (5). Later we will use multi-agent
reinforcement learning to obtain a numerical solution.
In this section, to simplify the problem, we consider a single stage
game11 where the agents have zero discount of the future, i.e., γ = 0. 11 The formulation (5) corresponds to
a repeated game as opposed to the
single stage game. Repeated games
capture the idea that an agent will have
to take into account the impact of its
current action on the future actions of
others. This impact is called the agent’s
reputation. The interaction is more
complex in a repeated game than that
in a single stage game.
Hence the objective function is reduced to
ui,k = arg minE[li,k], (6)
which only depends on the current actions of agents. According to
the state transition probability in table 1, the expected cost is
E[li,k] =
{
1−Πj∈Ik (1−min{ui, uj}) + αip(ui,k) if xi,k = 0
1+ αip(ui,k) if xi,k = 1
. (7)
Nash Equilibrium
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
u
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
co
st
Figure 5: Illustration of the curve
exp( 1u−1 ).
According to (7), the expect cost for an infected agent only depends
on its own action. Hence the optimal choice for an infected agent is
ui,k = u¯ := arg minu p(u). Then the optimal choice for a healthy agent
satisfies:
ui,k = arg minu [1−Πj∈Ik (1−min{u, u¯}) + αip(u)], (8)
= arg min
u
[1− (1−min{u, u¯})mk + αip(u)]. (9)
Note that the term 1− (1−min{u, u¯})mk is positive and is increasing
for u ∈ [0, u¯] and then constant for u ∈ [u¯, 1]. Hence, the optimal
solution for (9) should be smaller than u¯ = arg minu p(u).12 Then 12 If u ≥ u¯, then (9) becomes
arg minu[1 − (1 − u¯)mk + αip(u)],
whose optimal solution is u = u¯ with
cost [1− (1− u¯)mk + αip(u¯)]. If u ≤ u¯,
then (9) becomes arg minu J(u) where
J(u) = [1− (1− u)mk + αip(u)]. Since
∂
∂u |u¯ J(u) > 0, the optimal solution sat-
isfies that u < u¯ with cost J(u) < J(u¯).
Note that J(u¯) equals to the smallest
cost for the case u ≤ u¯. Hence the
optimal solution for (9) satisfies that
u < u¯.
the objective in (9) can be simplified as 1 − (1 − u)mk + αip(u). In
summary, the optimal actions for both the infected and the healthy
agents in the Nash Equilibrium can be compactly written as
ui,k = arg minu {1− (1− u)
mk (1− xi,k) + αip(u)}, ∀i. (10)
Example Consider the previous example with four agents shown in
Fig. 1. Define
p(u) = exp(
1
u− 1 ), (11)
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which is a monotonically decreasing function as illustrated in Fig. 5.
Then the optimal actions in the Nash Equilibrium for this specific
problem satisfy:
ui,k = arg minu {u+ xi,k − uxi,k + αi exp(
1
u− 1 )}, ∀i. (12)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
u
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
co
st
 = 0.5, Healthy
 = 0.5, Infected
 = 1, Healthy
 = 1, Infected
 = 2, Healthy
 = 2, Infected
 = 3, Healthy
 = 3, Infected
 = 5, Healthy
 = 5, Infected
Figure 6: Illustration of the objective
function in (12) under different condi-
tions.
Solving for (12), for infected agents, ui,k = 1. For healthy agents,
the choice also depends on αi as illustrated in Fig. 6. We have as-
sumed that αi = α which is identical for all agents. We further as-
sume that α < 2 such that the optimal solution for healthy agents
should be ui,k = 0. The optimal actions and the corresponding costs
for all agents are listed in table 2. In the Nash Equilibrium, no agent
will meet each other, since all agents except agent 1 reduce their ac-
tivity levels to zero. The actual cost (received at the next time step)
equals to the expected cost (computed at the current time step).
Agent ID State xi,k Optimal ui,k Optimal E[li,k] Actual li,k
1 1 1 1 1
2,3,4 0 0 α exp(−1) α exp(−1)
Total 1+ 3α exp(−1)
Table 2: List of the agent decisions and
associated costs in the Nash Equilib-
rium in the four-agent example.
However, let us consider another situation where the infected
agent chooses 0 activity level and all other healthy agents choose 1
activity level. The resulting costs are summarized in table 3. Obvi-
ously, the overall cost is reduced in the new situation. However, this
better situation cannot be attained spontaneously by the agents, due
to externality of the system which will be explained below.
Agent ID State xi,k Optimal ui,k Optimal E[li,k] Actual li,k
1 1 0 1+α exp(−1) 1+α exp(−1)
2,3,4 0 1 0 0
Total 1+ α exp(−1)
Table 3: List of the agent decisions
and associated costs in a situation
better than the Nash Equilibrium in the
four-agent example.
Dealing with Externality
For a multi-agent system, define the system cost as a summation of
the individual costs:
Lk :=∑
i
li,k. (13)
The system cost in the Nash Equilibrium is denoted L∗k , which corre-
sponds to the evaluation of Lk under agent actions specified in (10).
On the other hand, the optimal system cost is defined as
Lok := minui,k ,∀i
Lk. (14)
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The optimization problem (14) is solved in a centralized manner,
which is different from how the Nash Equilibrium is obtained. To
obtain the Nash Equilibrium, all agents are solving their own opti-
mization problems independently. Although their objective functions
depend on other agents’ actions, they are not jointly make the deci-
sions, but only “infer" what others will do. By definition, Lok ≤ L∗k . In
the example above, L∗k = 1+ 3α exp(−1) and Lok = 1+ α exp(−1). The
difference L∗k − Lok is called the loss of social welfare. In the epidemic
model, the loss of social welfare is due to the fact that bad conse-
quences (i.e., infecting others) are not penalized in the cost functions
of the infected agents. Those unpenalized consequences are called
externality. There can be both positive externality and negative exter-
nality. Under positive externality, agents are lacking motivations to
do things that are good for the society. Under negative externality,
agents are lacking motivations to prevent things that are bad for the
society. In the epidemic model, there are negative externality with
infected agents.
To improve social welfare, we need to “internalize" externality, i.e.,
add penalty for “spreading" the disease. Now let us redefine agent i’s
run-time cost as
l˜i,k = xi,k+1 + αip(ui,k) + xi,kq(ui,k), (15)
where q(·) is a monotonically increasing function. The last term
xi,kq(ui,k) does not affect healthy agents since xi,k = 0, but adds a
penalty for infected agents if they choose large activity level. One
candidate function for q(u) is 1− (1− u)mk . In the real world, such
“cost shaping" using q can be achieved through social norms or gov-
ernment regulation. The expected cost becomes
E[l˜i,k] =
{
1−Πj∈Ik (1−min{ui, uj}) + αip(ui,k) if xi,k = 0
1+ αip(ui,k) + q(ui,k) if xi,k = 1
(16)
Suppose the function q is well tuned such that the arg minu[αip(u) +
q(u)] = 0. Then although the expected costs for infected agents are
still independent from others, their decision is considerate to healthy
agents. When the infected agents choose u = 0, then for healthy
agents, the expected cost becomes αip(ui,k), meaning that they do not
need to worry about getting infected. Let us now compute the re-
sulting Nash Equilibrium under the shaped costs using the previous
example.
Example In the four-agent example, set q(u) = u. Then arg minu[αp(u)+
u] = 0. Hence agent 1 will choose u1,k = 0. For agents i = 2, 3, 4, they
will choose ui,k = 1 since they are only minimizing p(u). The re-
sulting costs are summarized in table 4. With the shaped costs, the
microscopic epidemic model and marl 11
system enters into a better Nash Equilibrium which indeed aligns
with the system optimum in (14). A few remarks:
• Cost shaping did not increase the overall cost for the multi-agent
system.
• The system optimum remains the same before and after cost shap-
ing.
• Cost shaping helped agents to arrive at the system optimum with-
out centralized optimization.
Agent ID State xi,k Optimal ui,k Optimal E[l˜i,k] Actual l˜i,k
1 1 0 1+α exp(−1) 1+α exp(−1)
2,3,4 0 1 0 0
Total 1+ α exp(−1)
Table 4: List of the agent decisions and
associated costs in the Nash Equilib-
rium with shaped cost functions in the
four-agent example.
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
We have shown how to compute the Nash Equilibrium of the multi-
agent epidemic model in a single stage. However, it is analytically
intractable to compute the Nash Equilibrium when we consider re-
peated games (5). The complexity will further grow when the num-
ber of agents increases and when there are information asymmetry.
Nonetheless, we can apply multi-agent reinforcement learning13 to 13 Lucian Bus¸oniu, Robert Babuška,
and Bart De Schutter. Multi-agent
reinforcement learning: An overview.
In Innovations in multi-agent systems and
applications-1, pages 183–221. Springer,
2010
numerically compute the Nash Equilibrium. Then the evolution of
the pandemic can be predicted by simulating the system under the
Nash Equilibrium.
Q Learning
As evident from (10), the optimal action for agent i at time k is a
function of xi,k and mk. Hence we can define a Q function (action
value function) for agent i as
Qi : xi,k ×mk × ui,k 7→ R. (17)
According to the assumptions made in the observation model, all
agents can observe mk at time k. For a single stage game, we have
derived in (10) that Qi(x,m, u) = 1 − (1 − u)m(1 − x) + αip(u).
For repeated games (5), we can learn the Q function using temporal
different learning. At every time k, agent i chooses its action as
ui,k = arg minu Qi(xi,k,mk, u). (18)
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After taking the action ui,k, agent i observes xi,k+1 and mk+1 and
receives the cost li,k at time k+ 1. Then agent i updates its Q function:
Qi(xi,k,mk, ui,k)← Qi(xi,k,mk, ui,k) + ηδi,k, (19)
δi,k = li,k + γminu Qi(xi,k+1,mk+1, u)−Qi(xi,k,mk, ui,k), (20)
where η is the learning gain and δi,k is the temporal difference error.
All agents can run the above algorithm to learn their Q functions
during the interaction with others. However, the algorithm intro-
duced above has several problems:
• Exploration and limited rationality.
There is no exploration in (18). Indeed, Q-learning is usually ap-
plied together with e-greedy where with probability 1 − e, the
action ui,k is chosen to be the optimal action in (18), and with
probability e, the action is randomly chosen with a uniform distri-
bution over the action space. The e-greedy approach is introduced
mainly from an algorithmic perspective to improve convergence of
the learning process. When applied to the epidemic model, it has
a unique societal implication. When agents are randomly choosing
their behaviors, it represents the fact that agents have only limited
rationality. Hence in the learning process, we apply e-greedy as a
way to incorporate exploration for faster convergence as well as to
take into account limited rationality of agents.
• Data efficiency and parameter sharing.
Keeping separated Q functions for individual agents is not data
efficient. An agent may not be able to collect enough samples to
properly learn the desired Q function. Due to the homogeneity as-
sumptions we made earlier about agents’ cost functions, it is more
data efficient to share the Q function for all agents. Its societal im-
plication is that agents are sharing information and knowledge
with each other. Hence, we apply parameter sharing14 as a way to 14 Jayesh K Gupta, Maxim Egorov,
and Mykel Kochenderfer. Coopera-
tive multi-agent control using deep
reinforcement learning. In Interna-
tional Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems, pages 66–83.
Springer, 2017
improve data efficiency as well as to consider information sharing
among agents during the learning process.15
15 In a more complex situation where
agents are not homogeneous, it is
desired to have parameter sharing with
a smaller group of agents, instead of
parameter sharing will all agents.
With the above modifications, the multi-agent Q learning algo-
rithm16 is summarized below.
16 Junling Hu and Michael P Wellman.
Nash Q-learning for general-sum
stochastic games. Journal of machine
learning research, 4(Nov):1039–1069, 2003
• For every time step k, agents choose their actions as:
ui,k =
{
arg minu Q(xi,k,mk, u) probability 1− e
random probability e
∀i. (21)
• At the next time step k + 1, agents observe the new states xi,k+1
and receive rewards li,k for all i. Then the Q function is updated:
Q(xi,k,mk, ui,k)← Q(xi,k,mk, ui,k) + ηδi,k, ∀i, (22)
δi,k = li,k + γminu Q(xi,k+1,mk+1, u)−Q(xi,k,mk, ui,k). (23)
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Example In this example, we consider M = 50 agents in the system.
Only one agent is infected in the beginning. The run-time cost is the
same as in the example in the distributed optimal control section, i.e.,
li,k = xi,k+1 + α exp( 1ui,k−1 ) where α is chosen to be 1. For simplicity,
the action space is discretized to be {0, 1/M, 10/M}, called as low,
medium, and high. Hence the Q function can be stored as a 2 ×
M × 3 matrix. In the learning algorithm, the learning rate is set to
η = 1. The exploration rate is set to decay in different episodes, i.e.,
e = 0.5(1− E/ max E) where E denotes the current episode and the
maximum episode is max E = 200. The Q function is initialized to
be 10 for all entries. Three different cases are considered. For each
case, we illustrate the Q function learned after 200 episodes as well
as the system trajectories for episodes 10, 20, . . . , 200, blue for earlier
episodes and red for later episodes. The results are shown in Fig. 7.
• Case 1: discount γ = 0 with runtime cost li,k.
With γ = 0, this case reduces to a single stage game as discussed
in the distributed optimal control section. The result should align
with the analytical Nash Equilibrium in (10). As shown in the left
plot in Fig. 7(a), the optimal action for a healthy agent is always
low (solid green), while the optimal action for an infected agent is
always high (dashed magenta). The Q values for infected agents do
not depend on mk. The Q values for healthy agents increase when
mk increases if the activity level is not zero, due to the fact that:
for a fixed activity level, the chance to get infected is higher when
there are more infected agents in the system. All these results
align with our previous theoretical analysis. Moreover, as shown
in the right plot in Fig. 7(a), the agents are learning to flatten the
curve across different episodes.
• Case 2: discount γ = 0.5 with runtime cost li,k.
Since the agents are now computing cumulative costs as in (5), the
corresponding Q values are higher than those in case 1. However,
the optimal actions remain the same, low (solid green) for healthy
agents, high (dashed magenta) for infected agents, as shown in
the left plot in Fig. 7(b). The trends of the Q curves also remain
the same: the Q values do not depend on mk for infected agents
and for healthy agents whose activity levels are zero. However, as
shown in the right plot in Fig. 7(b), the agents learned to flatten
the curve faster than in case 1, mainly because healthy agents are
more cautious (converge faster to low activity levels) when they
start to consider cumulative costs.
• Case 3: discount γ = 0.5 with shaped runtime cost l˜i,k in (15).
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The shaped cost changes the optimal actions for all agents as well
as the resulting Q values. As shown in the left plot in Fig. 7(c),
the optimal action for an infected agent is low (dashed green),
while that for a healthy agent is high (solid magenta) when mk is
small and low (solid green) when mk is big. Note that when mk
is high, the healthy agents still prefer low activity level, though
the optimal actions for infected agents are low. That is because:
due to the randomization introduced in e-greedy, there is still
chance for infected agents to have medium or high activity levels.
When mk is high, the healthy agents would rather limit their own
activity levels to avoid the risk to meet with infected agents that
are taking random actions. This result captures the fact that agents
understand others may have limited rationality and prefer more
conservative behaviors. We observe the same trends for the Q
curves as the previous two cases: the Q values do not depend on
mk for infected agents and for healthy agents whose activity levels
are not zero. In terms of absolute values, the Q values for infected
agents are higher than those in case 2 due to the additional cost
q(u) in l˜i,k. The Q values for healthy agents are smaller than those
in case 2 for medium and high activity levels, since the chance to
get infected is smaller as infected agents now prefer low activity
levels. The Q values remain the same for healthy agents with zero
activity levels. With shaped costs, the agents learned to flatten
the curve even faster than in case 2, as shown in the right plot in
Fig. 7(c), since the shaped cost encourages infected agents to lower
their activity levels.
Discussion and Future Work
Agents vs humans The epidemic model can be used to analyze real-
world societal problems. Nonetheless, it is important to understand
the differences between agents and humans. We can directly de-
sign and shape the cost function for agents, but not for humans. For
agents, their behavior is predictable once we fully specify the prob-
lem (i.e., cost, dynamics, measurement, etc). Hence we can optimize
the design (i.e., the cost function) to get desired system trajectory. For
humans, their behavior is not fully predictable due to limited ratio-
nality. We need to constantly modify the knowledge and observation
model as well as the cost function to match the true human behavior.
Future work The proposed model is in its preliminary form. Many
future directions can be pursued.
• Relaxation of assumptions.
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(a) Case 1 with discount γ = 0 and the original runtime cost.
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(b) Case 2 with discount γ = 0.5 and the original runtime cost.
10 20 30 40
Infected
0
2
4
6
Q 
va
lue
healthy, low
sick, low
healthy, medium
sick, medium
healthy, high
sick, high
0 20 40 60 80 100
Time
0
10
20
30
40
50
In
fe
ct
ed
(c) Case 3 with discount γ = 0.5 and the shaped runtime cost.
Figure 7: Results in the multi-agent
Q learning under the microscopic
epidemic model. The left plots show
the learned Q values after 200 episodes.
The horizontal axis corresponds to mk .
The vertical axis corresponds to the
Q values. Solid curves are for healthy
agents xi,k = 0. Dashed curves are for
infected agents xi,k = 1. Green curves
are for low activity levels ui,k = 0.
Purple curves are for medium activity
levels ui,k = 1/M. Magenta curves are
for high activity levels ui,k = 10/M.
The right plots illustrate the system
trajectories for episodes 10, 20, . . . , 200,
blue for earlier episodes and red for
later episodes. In the last episode in
all cases where there is no exploration
e = 0, the system trajectories are
horizontal with mk ≡ 1.
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We may add more agent states to consider recovery, incubation
period, and death. We may consider the fact that the interac-
tion patterns among agents are not uniform. We may consider a
wide variety of agents who are not homogeneous. For example,
health providers and equipment suppliers are key parts in fighting
the disease. They should receive lower cost (higher reward) for
maintaining or even expanding their activity levels than ordinary
people. Their services can then lead to higher recovery rate. In
addition, we may relax the assumptions on agents’ knowledge and
observation models, to consider information asymmetry as well
as partial observation. For example, agents cannot get immedi-
ate measurement whether they are infected or not, or how many
agents are infected in the system.
• Realistic cost functions for agents.
The cost functions for agents are currently hand-tuned. We may
learn those cost functions from data through inverse reinforcement
learning. Those cost functions can vary for agents from different
countries, different age groups, and different occupations. More-
over, the cost functions carry important cultural, demographical,
economical, and political information. A realistic cost function
can help us understand why we observe significantly different
outcomes of the pandemic around the world, as well as enable
more realistic predictions into the future by fully considering those
cultural, demographical, economical, and political factors.
• Incorporation of public policies.
For now, the only external intervention we introduced is cost shap-
ing. We may consider a wider range of public policies that can
change the closed-loop system dynamics. For example, shut-down
of transportation, isolation of infected agents, contact tracing, anti-
body testing, etc.
• Transient vs steady state system behaviors.
We have focused on the steady state system behaviors in the Nash
Equilibrium. However, as agents live in a highly dynamic world, it
is not guaranteed that a Nash Equilibrium can always be attained.
While agents are learning to deal with unforeseen situations, there
are many interesting transient dynamics, some of which is cap-
tured in Fig. 7, i.e., agents may learn to flatten the curve at differ-
ent rates. Methods to understand and predict transient dynamics
may be developed in the future.
• Validation against real world historical data.
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To use the proposed model for prediction in the real world, we
need to validate its fidelity again the historical data. The valida-
tion can be performed on the mk trajectories, i.e., for the same
initial condition, the predicted mk trajectories should align with
the ground truth mk trajectories.
Conclusion
This paper introduced a microscopic multi-agent epidemic model,
which explicitly considered the consequences of individual’s deci-
sions on the spread of the disease. In the model, every agent can
choose its activity level to minimize its cost function consisting of
two conflicting components: staying healthy by limiting activities and
maintaining high activity levels for living. We solved for the optimal
decisions for individual agents in the framework of game theory and
multi-agent reinforcement learning. Given the optimal decisions of
all agents, we can make predictions about the spread of the disease.
The system had negative externality in the sense that infected agents
did not have enough incentives to protect others, which then required
external interventions such as cost shaping. We identified future
directions were pointed out to make the model more realistic.
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